Abstract This paper studies the connection between risk-sharing and organizational form. It models the organizational form decision as a trade-off between the superior capital market access of the stock form and a regulatory or agency advantage held by the mutual form. When capital is expensive, consumers will substitute away from paying investors to supply risk-bearing capital and toward bearing more risk through mutual companies. The theory is supported with evidence from the Pennsylvania fire insurance market in . During this period, use of the mutual form moved in tandem with the insurance underwriting cycle.
Introduction
This paper examines competition between stock and mutual organizational forms in the Pennsylvania fire insurance market between 1874 and 1909. It finds that use of the mutual form was strongly connected to the insurance underwriting cycle. When prices rose, consumers shifted into mutual companies; when prices fell, consumers shifted into stock companies.
The differences between stock company policies and mutual company policies of this time period were dramatic. Stock policies were non-assessable, offering full protection to the consumer. The capital of the company was used to absorb losses in bad years. Mutual companies, on the other hand, held little or no capital and issued assessable policies. Assessable policies offered full reimbursement for losses but obligated consumers to pay additional assessments-often well in excess of the initial premium-when losses exceeded premiums collected.
The paper interprets the procyclical fortunes of the mutual form as being driven by changes in the cost of external risk bearing. The implicit cost of insurance capital soared during periods of high prices. During such periods, the prices charged by capital-intensive stock firms moved beyond the willingness-to-pay of many consumers. As a result, these consumers moved into mutual firms that offered cheaper policies but greater exposure to risk.
While a connection between mutuality and the cost of external risk bearing may be widely suspected, the theoretical underpinnings are not well understood. A first step toward an explanation is made by Doherty and Dionne [5] , who extend the ideas of Borch [3] and Marshall [13] by interpreting the mutual form as a device for coping with risk that is costly to diversify. However, the Doherty-Dionne analysis focuses on the derivation of an optimal contract, and the connection to organizational form is made only by extension. There is no reason within their model why the risk-sharing contracts associated with mutual firms (with greater emphasis on protection against diversifiable risk rather than undiversifiable risk) could not be offered by stock firms. More importantly, their argument appears to fail empirically in Lamm-Tennant and Starks [12] , who show that mutuals are less risky than stock firms. This latter evidence seems especially damning because it appears to strike at the heart of the basic motivation for mutuality-to share risk that cannot be diversified.
The theoretical section of the paper builds on Doherty-Dionne by explicitly modeling organizational form. The key assumption in the model is that stock firms are better at raising capital than mutual firms. This implies that stock firms have a comparative advantage in protecting consumers from risk and reverses the predicted cross-sectional relationship between organizational form and risk in the Doherty-Dionne framework: The stock form will be more popular in risky segments of the market because of a superior ability to absorb risk with capital. Thus, the paper shows that cross-sectional evidence may not be able to differentiate between agency-based and risk-based explanations of organizational form.
Agency-based and risk-based explanations of organizational form need not be mutually exclusive. The theory of the paper studies a trade-off between a capital market access advantage in the stock form and some type of advantage (e.g., agency, regulatory or other) in the mutual form. However, a take-home lesson from the paper is that the cost of external risk bearing is important.
The theory offers a clear prediction that increases in the cost of external risk bearing will be associated with greater use of the mutual form, and this prediction is borne out in the data.
The results seem likely to represent a broader phenomenon. Anecdotal evidence of a connection between mutuality and hard insurance markets can be found as early as 1835, where a crisis following New York's Great Fire spawned mutual formation. A more recent example is the proliferation of "bedpan" mutuals during the medical malpractice crisis of the 1970's. Finally, while the risk retention groups and captives being formed in today's hard market may not be mutuals in a technical sense, they are often interpreted in the trade press as a substitution toward greater risk-bearing in response to high prices in the traditional market.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theory. The first part of Section 3 presents the historical background for the empirical analysis, including the institutional details of the Pennsylvania fire insurance market. The second part presents simple empirical models of mutual market share and formation rates. Section 4 concludes.
Theory
Doherty and Dionne study a partial equilibrium model where undiversifiable risk is of a two-state variety-a high loss state and a low loss state. They replicate Borch's finding that idiosyncratic risk will be fully insured, but they also allow the undiversifiable risk to be offloaded for an exogenously determined price. In this context, consumers faced with undiversifiable risk will end up bearing some of it as they balance the benefits of security against the costs of external risk bearing. 1 Although Doherty and Dionne motivate their paper with reference to organizational form, the analytics focus exclusively on contract structure. Hence, the model delivers predictions about the extent of consumer riskbearing in the presence of undiversifiable risk. While it is tempting to equate consumer risk-bearing with the mutual form, the Lamm-Tennant and Starks paper suggests that such extensions are hazardous.
This paper models a trade-off between the stock form and the mutual form in the context of a model where a consumer with von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility faces an undiversifiable risk. Companies of either form protect consumers from undiversifiable risk by holding capital to (partially) absorb losses in states of the world where losses are high. The advantage of the stock form is capital market access: The stock form is assumed to be able to raise capital more cheaply than the mutual form, an assumption consistent with empirical evidence (see, e.g., Cummins and Viswanathan [4] , Harrington and Niehaus [11] , and Zanjani [19] ) and previous theoretical work (Philipson and Zanjani [15] ). The mutual form's comparative advantage may 1 Undiversifiable risk is present in other models of contract structure and organizational form. In particular, Smith and Stutzer [17] , [18] model participating contracts as being driven by an interaction between undiversifiable risk and moral hazard or adverse selection.
come from a superior alignment of consumer with owner incentives (see, e.g., Mayers and Smith [14] or Hansmann [9] ), a regulatory advantage, or any other difference that produces a cost advantage under some circumstances for the mutual form.
Formally, we consider a model with two states of the world-a "high loss" state of the world and a "low loss" state of the world. In the former state, each consumer faces a probability p h of experiencing a loss L; the probability of loss in the low state is p l , with p h > p l . The ex ante probability of the "high loss" state is π, and the probability of the "low loss" state is (1 − π).
The uninsured consumer therefore has utility of:
We now consider insurance and assume that the consumer will at least be able to completely eliminate idiosyncratic risk through assessable policies.
The problem of the undiversifiable risk, however, remains. If the consumer insures only against idiosyncratic risk, she will owe p l L (with probability π) and p h L (with probability 1 − π). The insurance problem that remains is to seek protection from this assessment risk, and the consumer must weigh the benefits of insurance protection against its cost.
The consumer first chooses an organizational form for her insurance company. Organizational form here is viewed as a continuum rather than a binary choice. This is done largely for analytical convenience, but it also reflects the reality that "mixed" companies-where the board was composed of policyholder-elected directors and investor-elected directors-existed. Moreover, it also reflects the fact that risk can be shared among companies through reinsurance, and such sharing could effectively mix organizational form. For example, a mutual's policyholders indirectly enjoy the benefits of the stock form (e.g., stronger capitalization) and indirectly bear the costs (e.g., higher regulatory costs) when the mutual reinsures with a stock company.
With this hybridization in mind, the organizational form variable is denoted α ∈ [0, 1], with α = 1 corresponding to a pure stock firm and α = 0 corresponding to a pure mutual firm. In other words, investor ownership and control is increasing in α.
The organizational form choice implies a company cost function described generally as c(α, K), where K is the capital held by the company. The cost function is assumed to be increasing in the amount of capital raised c K > 0 but may be either increasing or decreasing in the organizational form variable α. The cost function represents all costs of doing business except loss payments to policyholders. Thus, the cost function captures salaries of employees, taxes, auditor fees, and any costs associated with raising or holding capital-including any risk premium demanded by investors.
In a company that issued fully assessable policies and held no capital, consumer utility would be:
Capital can be introduced to act as a buffer by reducing assessments in the high loss state. Capital in this context consists of funds raised through the issuance of equity or debt to outside investors that will be available to absorb the undiversifiable risk. (In the case of a pure mutual company, this capital can be raised only through the issuance of subordinated debt.) But the consumer must make sacrifices for this buffer by paying 1) an actuarially fair amount to cover the expected loss on capital and 2) additional expenses associated with the raising and holding of capital. Thus, premiums are "fair" in the sense that they cover expected losses on capital and any costs reflected in the cost function.
We can write the consumer's optimization problem as:
where we have assumed that the loss portion of the premium (
tained within the company and is available to pay claims, while the other costs in the premium (c(α, K)) are either dissipated or distributed to shareholders before claims are paid. 2 Thus, the consumer must choose an organizational form and a level of capitalization conditional on the form chosen.
The first order condition for the choice of capital is
where U 0 l and U 0 h represent the marginal utility of wealth in the low and high loss states, respectively. The first term represents the marginal cost of holding capital-which derives from consumption sacrificed in the low loss state. The second term represents the marginal benefit-which derives 2 In other words, the premium is
, with only the former portion available for claims.
from the consumption added in the high loss state due to the presence of capital. By adding capital to the company, the consumer effectively trades consumption in the "low loss" state for consumption in the "high loss" state.
The first order condition for the choice of organizational form is:
The condition is satisfied only when c α = 0. In other words, organizational form is chosen so that insurance production costs are minimized for a given level of capitalization.
With additional structure, the problem will have a unique interior solution. Specifically, we assume twice differentiable functions with:
1. U is increasing, concave, and satisfies CARA.
The fourth assumption, c αK < 0, is the key to the analytics that follow.
It states that that stock firms can raise capital more cheaply than mutual firms. Moving toward the stock form will, by assumption, lower costs derived from capital, but it is still possible for such a move to raise total costs: The chosen organizational form may influence production costs independently of its effect on the marginal cost of capital (through the first argument in the cost function). The mutual form's disadvantage in capital-raising could be offset by other advantages. For example, the mutual form could be more costefficient than the stock form if it enjoyed lower monitoring costs (because of the better alignment of owner with consumer incentives) or lower regulation and taxes.
Theorem 1 Assume conditions (1) -(4)
. Let α * and K * be the optimal choices from Equation 1. If risk increases in the sense of a mean preserving spread of the loss probability distribution, the optimal choices α * and K * will also increase.
Proof: See Appendix.
The preceding theorem states that an increase in risk will be associated with 1) an increase in the amount of capital used in production and 2) an increased preference for the stock organizational form. The intuition is straightforward. When risk increases, the assessments in the low loss state drop, and assessments in the high loss state rise. As a result, the marginal value of consumption in the low loss state falls, while the corresponding quantity in the high loss state rises. This induces the consumer to trade consumption in the low loss state for consumption in the high loss state, and that is accomplished by adding capital to the insurance company. Furthermore, when the consumer desires more capital in the insurance company, the stock form's advantage in raising capital becomes relatively more important. As a result, a shift toward the stock form is experienced along with the increase in capitalization. Proof: See Appendix.
The preceding theorem states that an increase in the marginal cost of capital will lead to 1) a decrease in capital held and 2) a shift toward the mutual form. This is merely an elaboration of the raw intuition of Doherty and Dionne. When it is costly to pay outside investors (i.e., suppliers of capital) to bear risk, consumers will substitute toward bearing it themselves. The innovation here is a concrete connection to organizational form. When the consumer shifts away from using capital for protection, the stock form's cost advantage in accessing the capital market becomes relatively less important.
This results in a concomitant shift toward the mutual form.
Evidence
The theoretical section suggests two testable hypotheses. property-casualty insurance markets. More precisely, prices behave in a cycli-cal manner, and this behavior has been connected to unexpected changes in capacity or capital (see Gron [8] ). In what follows, we study the relationship between changes in the cost of external risk-bearing (as measured by the price of insurance sold by stock companies) and use of the mutual form in the Pennsylvania fire insurance market between 1874 and 1909.
Background
The modern day relationship between risk and organizational form has become opaque for several reasons. First, we are confronted with forms that defy easy classification. To illustrate, captives and risk retention groups are usually set up as stock firms, but the shareholders and policyholders are typically one and the same. Second, comprehensive data is difficult to obtain. This applies especially in the case of captives, where financial information generally not a matter of public record. 3 Finally, even where data is readily available and the lines between organizational forms are clearly drawn-as is the case when comparing traditional stock and mutual insurers-interpretation is difficult. The major mutuals of today bear scant resemblance to the risk-sharing institutions for which the term "mutual" was coined. To illustrate, the three largest property-casualty mutuals account for more than half of total mutual market share in the U.S. and, with billions in policyholder surplus accumulated over decades of operations, boast strong financial strength ratings. In practice, policyholders in such companies face little financial risk from assessments.
This was not always the case. U.S. mutual fire insurance had its roots on small, local companies that issued assessable policies. At several multiples of the initial premium, the potential assessments were significant (see, e.g.,
Bainbridge [1] ,p. 82). While the mutuals that succeeded grew beyond these roots and dropped the assessment provision, one could argue that the behemoths of today are neither representative of the idea as originally conceived nor informative about the problems that mutual insurance was created to solve. In the empirical analysis that follows, we focus on a time closer to the birth of the mutual idea, when mutual insurance was clearly distinguished in concept from stock insurance. There were several legal distinctions between stock and mutual companies in Pennsylvania. The 1873 act was amended in 1876 to address incorporation requirements. It set a minimum capital requirement for stock companies at $100,000 that had to be fully paid in before commencement of business. 4 Mutuals were not required to have a minimum surplus, but they had to collect applications for insurance in the amount of $200,000 (of insured risk) before starting business. Governance requirements were familiar. Directors of stock companies were elected according to "one share, one vote"; directors in mutual companies were elected according to "one member, one vote."
Mutuals were subjected to less regulation and taxation than stock firms.
The 1873 law exempted mutual fire companies from every regulation except examination and reporting. While stock companies were subjected to annual solvency tests, mutual companies were deemed to be solvent so long as their premium notes (the amount that could be assessed) amounted to 3% of their outstanding insured risk. Domestic stock firms paid a tax of 0.8% on premiums and 0.3% on capital for much of the sample period, while mutuals paid nothing.
Companies were required to operate either on the "joint-stock plan" or the "mutual plan," but not both. There was a stated exception for mutual companies that had accumulated sufficient assets to establish a capital stock, in which case they were permitted to convert to a stock company and could companies (with a minimum capital of $50,000) and mutual companies. The insurance commissioner reported that the minimum capital requirement was often abused, with many companies starting business before capital was fully paid in.
operate on both plans during the transition. In practice, however, mutuals enjoyed even greater freedom of action. The statute neglected to precisely define "mutual plan," and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that mutual companies were generally permitted to issue "cash" (non-assessable) policies if they so desired. This caused considerable consternation for the insurance commissioner, who argued strenuously against the practice (Report of 1896, p. xiii):
What protection is there for a policy holder in a so-called mutual company which issues only cash policies? The law does not provide the same safe-guards that it does in the case of joint-stock companies;
if it provides any safe-guards at all they are painfully obscure and indefinite.
Hence, even aside from agency or capital market access issues that might have linked each organizational form with a particular policy type, the stock form was legally constrained to supply policies that offered fuller protection from risk.
The 1873 and 1876 legislation formed the foundation of Pennsylvania fire insurance regulation for the next several decades. A surplus lines law appeared in 1887, which enabled insurance through unlicensed companies under certain conditions (including the payment of a 6% premium tax). A uniform fire policy law appeared in 1891. For the most part, however, the basic framework remained unchanged until a major reform in 1911. In recognition of the potential impact of this reform, we cut off the analysis at the end of 1909-slightly more than a year before the reform's enactment.
Pricing and the Underwriting Cycle
Mutual fire insurance appears to have been substantially cheaper than stock fire insurance according to the usual metrics. Figure 1 presents a time series of paid loss ratios for the two forms. Mutual loss ratios were higher in 23 of the 26 years in the sample.
The averages over the the entire sample period were 0.67 for mutuals and 0.54 for stock firms, implying that prices (relative to expected loss) in stock firms were, on average, about 24% higher. This probably understates the difference. Some mutuals paid substantial policyholder dividends, and these are not reflected in the data (see, e.g., Bainbridge [1] , p.87).
The loss ratios suggest a cyclical pattern but, of course, are a volatile indicator of pricing. We now turn to more direct pricing information for confirmation. Figure 2 shows a Pennslyvania price index based on premiums collected divided by total risks insured (exposure) for stock companies; It is worth noting that mutual pricing appears to have followed the cycle in stock pricing to some degree. For example, mutual loss ratios fell along with stock loss ratios during the hard markets of the mid-1890's and the early 1900's. There are at least two possible explanations for this connection. Mutual Share and the Underwriting Cycle Table 1 presents sample statistics for mutual market share, mutual formations, and log of price, where the price is based on the exposure-based data from Pennsylvania. Table 2 presents the results of simple linear regressions with mutual market share as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are time, log of price, and lagged mutual market share. The results imply that an ten percent increase in price was associated with a one to two point increase in mutual market share.
Mutual Activity and the Underwriting Cycle
Mutual Formations and the Underwriting Cycle To measure the association between prices and mutual formations, we estimate a Poisson regression model:
where Y t is a random variable corresponding to the number of mutuals formed in year t, N t is a population estimate 6 for Pennsylvania in year t.
The log of the mean formation rate is:
where x t is a matrix of explanatory variables. 
Conclusion
In common parlance, "mutual insurance" implies a sharing of risk among consumers. However, most economic analysis has focused on agency-related motivations for organizational form and has de-emphasized the importance of risk-sharing. This paper has shown that the risk-sharing motivation for mutuality is not inconsistent with agency theory and, furthermore, that this motivation was empirically important in the past.
It is difficult to determine the importance of this motivation today because mutual formation is no longer common. 7 Indeed, the question of motivation may be a moot point for most modern mutuals. The substantial surplus accumulations in today's larger mutual companies, the decline of the assessable policy, and the protection offered by state guaranty funds mean that today's mutual policyholder is not bearing much risk. But if mutuals are indeed vestigial "anachronisms" (Hansmann [10] ), then the behavior of today's companies may not give us much insight into the motivations behind their formation.
On the other hand, there is some anecdotal evidence connecting risk-sharing motivations to the use of alternative organizational forms even today.
The medical malpractice crisis of the mid-1970's bred a bevy of new mutuals.
More recent insurance market crises in the mid-1980's and the early 2000's have bred increased formation of captives and risk retention groups. While these are not technically mutuals, the insureds are usually the owners and the primary risk-bearers. Moreover, the trade press often interprets the use of alternative organizational forms as a response to high prices in the commercial insurance market. This seems to be an area that deserves more exploration from economists.
Appendix
Maximization of (1) yields first order conditions (2) and (3). The second order condition is fulfilled if the determinant of the Hessian H is positive.
H equals
and is positive by Assumptions (1) and (2). Thus, we have an interior solution.
Proof of Theorem 1 We now consider a mean-preserving spread of the two-state distribution while retaining the two-state nature of the distribution.
Let β be the amount by which p l is reduced and δ the amount by which p h is increased. For the mean to be preserved, it must be the case that:
(1 − π)(p l − β) + π(p h + δ) = (1 − π)p l + πp h .
This implies that:
So we may rewrite (1) as:
The first order conditions are still (2) 
